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Bringing Consistency to the
Financial Arrangements at Divorce
BY ALLEN M. PARKMAN"
I. INTRODUCTION
ew e wedding vows have traditionally included the declara-
f tion that spouses are committing themselves to a union that
• • will last until one of them dies, the fulfillment of that
commitment has become less common as many marriages now end in
divorce! As a consequence, the financial arrangements at the end of a
marriage are as likely to occur in a divorce court as in a probate court.
Unfortunately, financial arrangements at divorce lack a consistent
framework as they have developed in an ad hoc manner. Statutes establish-
ing the standards for these financial arrangements, which potentially
consist of child support, alimony/spousal support, and property division,
have existed for a long time.2 However, for most of American history, these
statutes were ignored. Until recently, the grounds for divorce were based
on fault, creating pressure for spouses, especially those with substantial
assets, to negotiate the dissolution of their marriage, including their own
financial arrangements. Under the fault grounds for divorce, it was very
difficult to win a contested divorce,' so negotiated settlements in which the
"Regents' Professor of Management, University of New Mexico. B.A. 1962,
Brown University; Ph.D. (Economics) 1973, University of California, Los Angeles;
J.D. 1979, University of New Mexico.
'The divorce rate rose from 8 per thousand married women in 1920 to 22.6 per
thousand married women in 1980 before declining to 20.9 per thousand in 1990.
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 64 (1975) [hereinafter
HISTORICAL STATISTICS]; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 102 (1995) [hereinafter
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1995].
2 Because there is more consistency in child support, the primary emphasis in
this article is on alimony/spousal support and property division.
' In some cases, such as when the "guilty" spouse sought the divorce or when
there was no technical ground, a contested divorce was impossible to obtain.
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parties fabricated the necessary testimony to establish the fault grounds
were common practice.4 A spouse who initially opposed a divorce could
sometimes be induced to become the petitioner in a divorce action based
on an attractive financial and custodial package. In constructing this
divorce package, the spouses could usually ignore the applicable statutes
controlling the financial arrangements.' For example, in a community
property state that provided each spouse with an equal share of marital
property at divorce, the spouse who initially resisted the divorce could ask
for-and expect-a much larger share of the couple's assets.
This situation changed in a subtle way with the introduction of no-fault
divorce, since in most states a divorce could now be obtained unilaterally.6
The need for concessions by a spouse wanting a divorce diminished.
Consequently, the gains from negotiations were reduced so that the
financial arrangements at divorce were more likely to conform to statutory
standards. Either the parties accepted those standards or the courts were
asked to apply them.7 Even when the couple negotiated, they were often
limitedto trading offmore predictable property for less predictable spousal
support within the overall range of outcomes expected under the law.
With this new emphasis on statutory requirements, the inconsistency
of the financial arrangements at divorce became more apparent. The
primary criterion for alimony was "need"; the meaning of which, as well
as why the ex-spouse should be responsible for meeting it, was hopelessly
Moreover, the courts tended to apply more stringent standards of proof in contested
cases. Lastly, contested fault divorces were messy, and most people preferred to
avoid them if at all possible. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL
350 (3d ed. 1995).
' While collusion could be a bar to a divorce, the courts tended to accept the
mostperfunctory allegations as abasis fora divorce. See id. at 352. Max Rheinstein
also notes that collusive practices and migratory divorce had been common in the
United States under fault divorce. See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY,
DIVORCE AND THE LAW 247 (1972); see also Donald Schiller, Domestic
Relations-A Survey of Mental Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce, 15 DEPAUL L.
REV. 159, 163 (1965).
' See KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 352.
6 As the states reacted to the perjury-ridden fault divorces, they overreacted by
making divorce a unilateral decision and "marriage a form of 'employment at will,'
typically without a 'golden parachute."' Id. at 396. In a few states, such as New
York, mutual consent is required for a no-fault divorce. See NEW YORK DOMESTIC
RELATIONS LAW § 170(6) (McKinney 1988).
7 See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 952-56 (1979).
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confused.' While the criteria used in property divisions were usually
viewed as more straightforward, numerous problems existed. Although a
marriage was based on the voluntary union of two people who committed
themselves to applying their skills and efforts toward their common
welfare, the property acquired during the marriage often was not attributed
to both spouses. In many states, both spouses worked in their separate
environments, but if there were a divorce, property would be attributed to
the spouse, usually the husband, who had title to the property.' Other less
tangible assets, such as pensions, were sometimes attributed only to the
person earning an income." In addition, the courts were only willing to,
consider a limited range of items as property. They recognized tangible
assets "such as real and personal property-houses and cars-and financial
assets-stocks and bonds," while ignoring individuals' increasingly
important but intangible assets such as their capacity to earn income.1'
These inconsistencies continued even after a divorce. If the couple divorced
and then one of them filed for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code permitted
the discharge of property settlement obligations while continuing support
obligations. 2 These inconsistencies were less obvious during the fault
divorce era because most divorces involving substantial financial resources
had been negotiated and, therefore, the statutes had not been subjected to
close scrutiny.
s See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 5 (Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997) [hereinafter ALI
PRINCIPLES]; HOMERH. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OFDOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS INTHE
UNITED STATES 620 (2d ed. 1988); KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 404; Ira M. Ellman,
The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) ("Even the definition of
'need'-the most fundamental issue created by such statutes-is hopelessly
confused.").
9 See KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 428.
" See id. at 444; see also Grace Ganz Blumberg, Marital Property Treatment
ofPensions, Disability Pay, Workers' Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutes:
An Insurance, orReplacement, Analysis, 33 UCLAL. REV. 1250, 1256-57 (1986).
" Allen M. Parkman, Human Capital as Property in Celebrity Divorces, 29
FAM. L.Q. 141, 142 (1995) [hereinafter Parkman, Human Capital].
12 See Allen M. Parkman, The Dischargeability of Post-Divorce Financial
Obligations Between Spouses: Insights From Bankruptcy in Business Situations,
31 FAM. L.Q. 493, 493-94 (1997) [hereinafter Parkman, Dischargeability];
Michaela M. White, Divorce After the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994: Can You
Stay Warm After You Split the Blanket?, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 617, 620-21
(1996).
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With closer.judicial scrutiny because of the more active role of the
courts in these financial arrangements, constructive changes have occurred.
Problems associated with alimony, which in many states is now called
spousal support, have been reduced by limiting the situations under which
alimony is provided. 3 For example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
permits it only when two conditions have been met: the ex-wife has too
little property to meet her needs, and she is unable to support herself or has
custody of a child that makes employment unrealistic. 4 Still, a convincing
reason why alimony should be awarded even in these limited cases is
lacking. 5
The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution ("ALI Principles") attempts to provide additional clarity
regarding the role of alimony by proposing that it should be based on
compensation rather than on need. 6 These payments would provide
compensation for a loss in living standard, in earning capacity, from an
investment in the other spouse's earning capacity, and in the ability to
recover his or her premarital living standard after the dissolution of a short
marriage.'7 Under the ALI Principles, compensatory spousal payments for
a loss of living standard or in earning capacity, like alimony, generally end
with remarriage or death 8 and can be modified. 9 Compensation is based
upon a sharing of the spouses' postdissolution incomes, although the
income transfer often has only a very limited link to the loss incurred.0
Alternatively, compensation for investments in the other spouse's earning
capacity and for assistance in recovering his or her premarital living
standard after the dissolution of a short marriage is more directly related to
the actual losses incurred. These losses cannot be modified and do not
terminate with remarriage or death.2'
'3 See CLARK, supra note 8, at 619.
14 See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 347 (1987).
" Less than 15 percent of divorced women are awarded alimony, and only
slightly more than 10 percent of them actually receive it. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS,U.S. DEP'TOF COMMERCE, CURRENTPOPULATIONREPORTS, SERIES P-60,
NO. 173, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1989, at 10 tbl. G, 12 tbl. I (1991)
[hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY].
'6 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, § 5.02, at 259.
'
7 See id. § 5.03, at 271.
"S See id. § 5.08, at 350.
'9 See id. § 5.09, at 357.20 See id. § 5.05, at 280, § 5.06, at 317.
21 Seeid. § 5.17, at 406.
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Still, the ALI Principles lacks consistency because it does not provide
a logical reason why ex-spouses' incomes should be shared just because
they were married. Without a clearly defined reason, numerous injustices
will occur. For example, a woman who made numerous sacrifices before
marriage to acquire important income-earning skills, such as a medical
education, will be forced to share her income with a man who did not make
similar sacrifices either before or during marriage. On the other hand, if a
spouse limits a career to provide important services in the home and that
loss is recognized at dissolution, the loss will not disappear even if the
person remarries, at which time the ALI Principles would normally
terminate compensation."
During the last few decades, the rules governing the division of
property at divorce have also been improved. Real property acquired during
marriage is now treated as martial property irrespective of the name on the
title.' Recognizing that a marriage is a partnership, assets such as pensions
acquired by an income-earning spouse are attributed to both spouses and
are shared at divorce.24 However, inconsistencies still exist because of the
limited range of assets recognized as part of the property division.
Intangible assets, such as an individual's capacity to earn income, are
handled in an ad hoc manner. The distinction between separate and marital
property also continues to be blurred. For example, in marriages of a
minimum duration, the ALI Principles would recharacterize a portion of
separate property as marital property.' The Bankruptcy Code has been
amended to make it more difficult for ex-spouses to avoid the financial
obligations incurred during a divorce through bankruptcy, but the
distinction between the dischargeability of support and property division
obligations continues.26 In summary, numerous inconsistencies continue in
the financial arrangements at divorce because of the ambiguous role of
alimony, the lack of a clear understanding of what is property and how it
should be valued, and the treatment of support and property division
obligations after dissolution.
22 See id.
23 See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, YOUR LEGAL GUIDE TO MARRIAGE AND OTHER
RELATIONSHIPS 58 (1989) [hereinafter LEGAL GUIDE TO MARRIAGE].
24 See J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF
PROPERTY § 7.10, at 7-60 (1996).
2s See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, § 4.18, at 238.26 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 304, 108 Stat.
4106, 4132 (codified as amended at I 1 U.S.C. § 326(b)(2)(A) (1994)); White,
supra note 12, at 623-24.
1998-99]
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This article argues that consistency in the financial arrangements at
divorce can be increased by recognizing that financial arrangements should
be based on "debts" incurred during marriage and that these debts should
not be dischargeable in bankruptcy. A debt is something that one entity is
bound to pay to another.27 In a business setting, this obligation commonly
arises when a creditor does something for a debtor such as lending money.
In other words, the creditor is making a sacrifice for the debtor's benefit for
which the creditor expects compensation. Similar sacrifices, although not
as formal and often without a monetary transfer, commonly occur in
marriages, thereby creating debts. These debts can be from the couple to
either a spouse or a child or from one spouse to the other. For example, a
couple can acquire marital property such as mutual fund shares by saving,
which is the sacrifice of current consumption that should be treated as a
debt of the couple to the spouses as individuals if there is a divorce. Other
acts such as uncompensated educational support create a debt between the
spouses. Electing to become parents imposes a debt obligation on the
parents to support their children during their minority. More important than
the current distinctions between child support, alimony, and property
settlement is whether these debts will be eliminated by remarriage.
The next section discusses the importance of consistency in the
financial arrangements at divorce. Section III addresses why the current
system of financial arrangements lacks consistency. A framework is
presented in Section IV to explain why treating the financial obligations
that result from marriage as debts at divorce promotes consistency. Last,
the debt framework will be applied to the normal situations calling for
compensation at divorce.
H. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSISTENCY
IN THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS AT DIVORCE
While the ALI Principles expresses a concern for "an equitable sharing
of the losses from the dissolution of the family relationship" '28 in the
financial arrangements at divorce, a subtler but equally important goal
should be encouraging consistent outcomes that increase social welfare.
The current inconsistencies work to frustrate that goal. Social welfare is
increased when choices are made for which the benefits exceed the costs
27 See WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 373 (1989).
28 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at xiii.
[VOL. 87
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS AT DIVORCE
and the preferred choices result in the largest net benefits.2 9 Many of the
decisions made by adults prior to and during marriage are influenced by the
financial arrangements should they divorce. For example, if a divorce can
be obtained easily based on no-fault grounds, but spouses are not ade-
quately compensated for the diminution in their earning capacity because
they sacrificed a career to work at home during the marriage, we would
expect spouses to be reluctant to work at home during marriage. 0
Generally, people expect to be rewarded for their sacrifices, and the larger,
more predictable, and more consistent the rewards, the more likely they are
to incur the sacrifices.
Marriages often benefit from sacrifices by family members. At the
outset, there is the sacrifice of the opportunity to marry someone else.
Sacrifices continue during marriage as spouses become parents and as they
accumulate property. In all these cases, the sacrifices are incurred willingly
because they are associated with substantial benefits. So long as the
perceived net benefits are positive, these choices increase social welfare.
By ignoring the inconsistent statutory financial arrangements,
negotiated divorces in the past had the ability to increase social welfare.
For most of American history, the consensus was that a divorce would
seldom improve social welfare; therefore, severe restrictions were placed
on divorce. This was motivated in part by one man rarely being capable of
supporting two families. In the twentieth century, divorces based on fault
grounds became more common." Still, it was not likely that a spouse
wanting a divorce could conveniently obtain evidence of fault such as
adultery, desertion, or cruelty. Adultery, for example, was only a ground
for divorce if asserted by the innocent spouse, not the one committing the
adultery. Therefore, most spouses who wanted a divorce hadto obtain the
cooperation of their mate.33
29 For an opposing viewpoint, see Jeffery L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and
Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309
(1986).
30 See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985); Allen M.
Parkman, Unilateral Divorce and the Labor-Force Participation Rate ofMarried
Women, Revisited, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 671 (1992) [hereinafter Parkman,
Unilateral Divorce]; H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational
Constraints andPrivate Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986).
31 Particularly noteworthy was the increased labor forceparticipation of married
women. See CLARK, supra note 8, at 410.32 See KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 350.
33 See id.
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Central to that cooperation was a package of concessions. While
statutes establishedthe financial arrangements at divorce, the spouses could
ignore those statutes in their negotiations if the prescribed outcomes were
inferior to those that they could arrange for themselves. Initially, by the act
ofgetting marriedthe spouses must have concludedthat marriage increased
both their welfare and that of society. Hopefully, the married state
continued. However, a spouse sometimes decided that he or she would be
happier divorced.34 At that point, it was not clear whether social welfare
would be improved by a divorce. Improvement of social welfare would
only occur if the benefit to the initiator exceeded the costs to others,
especially the other spouse and their children. Ignoring the underlying
statutes, the spouses could investigate whether there was a set of transfers
from one to the other that would leave them both in a better position. This
occurred in an environment in which both spouses knew that the optimism
that existed at the time of marriage was no longer realistic. So, while
spouses who initially did not want a divorce would have preferred that the
marriage returned to a happier time, they knew that was not likely.
Therefore, the reluctant spouses may have seen a bundle of periodic
payments of child support and property as preferable to the current
marriage. Any cost imposed on the children was in part addressed by the
parent anticipating custody. The spouse who anticipated having custody of
any children had incentives to take the welfare of the children into account.
If the divorce was expected to have a disastrous effect on the children
relative to their welfare if the marriage continued, then the spouse who
anticipated custody had some incentives to consider this as part of his or
her costs of divorce.35 Meanwhile, if the spouses who initiated a divorce
34 When both spouses more or less simultaneously decided that they would be
better off divorced, the divorce was highly likely to improve social welfare,
especially if there were no children. Although the process that leads spouses to
prefer a divorce to their current marriage is complicated, Gary Becker has provided
some valuable insights. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 326
(1991). People many because they anticipate that they are going to be better off
married to a particular person than they are going to be in any other living
situation. However, they make that decision about the future with limited
information. Frequently, they acquire additional information after marriage that
leads them to the conclusion that they would be better off dissolving their marriage.
Becker notes that the rapid accumulation of new information about your spouse
during the first few years of marriage causes the divorce rates to be highest during
those early years, with the rate declining after four or five years. See id.
35 Most authors agree that the preferred living arrangement for children is with
their parents. See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A
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saw the end of the marriage as more valuable than the concessions
necessary to obtain the divorce, they would be better off. While in an ideal
world there would never be an unhappy marriage and certainly no divorces,
most marriages actually ending in a negotiated divorce during the fault
divorce era tended to increase social welfare.
Alternatively, if these negotiations failed, there would be no divorce if
the net benefits were negative. The spouse who initially wanted the divorce
may have been unwilling or unable to provide concessions that would
induce the other spouse to participate in the divorce. For example, a
woman, thinking that she no longer loved her husband, considered divorce
and then realized that because of her husband's continuing attraction to her,
he would require concessions that would make divorce unattractive. While
the net benefits from this marriage might be very small, the consensus of
the couple would be that they are better off married than divorced.3 6 Some
exceptions to this process obviously existed because spouses could desert
their families or alternatively abuse their spouses to the point that they
would be willing to participate in the divorce. Desertion and abuse were
restricted to some extent during most of American history by communities
exercising their right to supervise marriages.37 Still, by the middle of the
twentieth century, most marriages were dissolved with consensual divorces
in which the spouses were voluntary, if not enthusiastic, participants.
Therefore, by ignoring the underlying statutes, most divorces obtained
during the fault divorce era increased social welfare."
SINGLE PARENT 1 (1994). However, a divorce may be better for the children than
the continuation of an unhappy and disruptive marriage. See JUDITH S.
WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES (1989).
" See Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the Marriage
Contract, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 91, 102 (1993) [hereinafter Parkman, Reform of the
Divorce Provisions].
37 See HELENA M. WALL, FIERCE COMMUNION: FAMILY AND COMMUNITY IN
EARLY AMERICA 53 (1990).38This is especially true due to the transaction costs associated with divorce. As
a result of these transaction costs, the benefits to initiators would have to be
substantially larger than the costs to the other spouse and children before there
could be a divorce. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Costs, 3 J.L.
& ECoN. 1, 15-16 (1960). These transaction costs occur because of public goods,
which are valued in heterogeneous units, and the legal costs of divorce, which can
be significant. See Douglas W. Allen, Marriage and Divorce - Comment, 82 AM.
ECON. REV. 679 (1992).
A public good is something that can be provided to additional people at little
or no cost. These additional people are difficult to exclude. Children are a public
1998-99]
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The likelihood that a divorce would enhance social welfare decreased
with the introduction of no-fault divorce because of the reduction in the
negotiating power of the spouse who wanted to continue the marriage and
the corresponding increase inthe relevance of statutory standards. Divorces
are now possible even when the gain to the spouse wanting the divorce is
less than the cost to the other family members. Since a divorce can be
obtained by a spouse without the consent of the other spouse, the financial
arrangements at divorce are more likely to conform to legal standards that
are often illogical, inconsistent, and generally limited. 9 Alimony continues
to be highly arbitrary and even less commonly awarded than in the past.40
The property settlements in both community property and equitable
distribution states tend toward an equal division of a limited range of
marital assets.41 Child support in all states is determined by guidelines
based on the parents' incomes.42 The likelihood thus increases that the
good for a married couple as both parents can simultaneously enjoy the children.
This simultaneous enjoyment is no longerpossible with divorce. SeeMartin Zelder,
Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence ofPublic Goods: The Case ofNo-Fault
Divorce, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 505 (1993). If the parents love their children, a
divorce imposes a cost on the noncustodial parent for which there is no
corresponding benefit for the custodial parent. Negotiations can also be frustrated
because the resources available to the family may be in heterogenous units. An
agreement is more likely to occur with homogeneous units such as money. If the
wife wants more assets than prescribed by law and the husband is willing to give
them, then an agreement can be reached. Alternatively, an agreement becomes
more difficult if the husband is offering assets, but the wife wants the prestige
associated with the current marriage. Finally, any costs associated with divorce
such as legal fees reduce the funds available for transfers between the spouses.39 See J. Thomas Oldham, ALl Principles of Family Dissolution: Some
Comments, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 801, 818 ("Twenty years ago, all states gave
judges unfettered discretion regarding all elements of the economic consequences
of divorce.").
" Only 14.6% of divorced women were awarded alimony in the 1980s, and
even fewer actually received it. See CHILD SUPPORT ANDALIMONY, supra note 15,
at 10 tbl. G, 12 tbl. I. Limiting alimony appears to be the position taken in the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which only permits alimony where the person
claiming alimony meets limited conditions. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 347 (1987).
4' See Blumberg, supra note 10, at 1260.
42 The couple could still negotiate, but the transaction costs that worked to keep
the marriage together now work to make divorce more likely. This is especially
true because of heterogeneous units. The spouse wanting to maintain the marriage
may be offering more of something (i.e., ongoing family life) that has little value
[VOL. 87]
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financial arrangement at divorce will not adequately compensate spouses
who made sacrifices during marriage for their family's benefit.
While the financial arrangements at divorce can consist of child
support, property division, and alimony, the primary focus here is on the
latter two.' The reasons for and the computation of child support do not
have the same problems that occur with property division and alimony.
The logic behind child support is fairly straightforward as society
imposes certain responsibilities on people when they become parents. The
most fundamental of those obligations is to support their children. During
marriage, society does not have to assume a major role in that process.
However, with the dissolution of the marriage, the state has to assure that
the financial needs of the child will be met. Because of problems with
parents (usually fathers) fulfilling their obligations, Congress passed
legislation, including the Family Support Act of 1988.44 States are now
required "to create guidelines for setting initial [child support] awards, to
update awards on a regular basis, and to automatically withhold support
obligations from the paychecks of nonresident parents" if necessary.4 As
states have developed their child support guidelines, the dominant model
used is one based on income sharing by the parents.46 The computation of
child support guidelines in most states has been based on academic
research. 7 A cost to the custodial parent that is not contained in these child
support guidelines is any income that the parent sacrifices due to his or her
custodial responsibilities.48 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act seems
to the spouse seeking the divorce.
4 This discussion is based on the continuation of no-fault as the primary ground
for divorce. See Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions, supra note 36, at 93.
Because the courts are incapable of determining many of the costs of divorce,
mutual consent may be a better ground for divorce from mature marriages. See id.
at 105-06.
44 42 U.S.C. § 600 (1988).
45 Allen M. Parkman, The Government's Role in the Support of Children, 11
BYUJ. PUB. L. 55, 60 (1997) (footnote omitted).46 See Robert G. Williams, Implementation of the Child Support Provisions of
the Family Support Act: Child Support Guidelines, Updating of Awards, and
Routine Income Withholding, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 93
(Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1994).47 Many states use the data from THOMAS ESPENSHADE, INVESTING IN CHIL-
DREN (1984). The basic child support obligation consists of total child support
excluding health insurance, work-related childcare costs, and extraordinary medical
expenses. See id.
48 The ALI Principles defers this issue to the chapter on child support. See ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at xl.
1998-99]
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to contemplate that an award of child support might include a sum for the
support of the child's custodial parent, but that is not a pattern contained in
the states' child support guidelines.49
Actual property divisions and alimony do not have the consistency for
which child support is noted. While statutes control the financial value of
total awards, the spouses can negotiate allocation of the award between the
property settlement and alimony as divorce settlements often are driven by
the treatment of the spouses after divorce rather than by legal standards.
First, alimony can generally be modified whereas a property division
cannot. Second, alimony payments usually terminate when the recipient
remarries, but remarriage does not affect a property division. Third,
alimony is usually enforceable by contempt sanctions, while in some states,
the award of property is not.50 Fourth, alimony, in contrast to a property
division, cannot be discharged in bankruptcy."' Finally, alimony payments
that comply with the statutory definition of alimony are taxable to the
payee and deductible by the payor regardless of whether the purpose of the
payments is support or simply the transfer of property between spouses. 2
Meanwhile, a transfer of property to a former spouse under a divorce
decree is not a taxable event.53 Therefore, while the basic ideas behind a
property settlement are to return the parties' separate property and to divide
the property acquired during the marriage, alimony is meant to serve other
purposes such as providing for the basic financial needs of a spouse. A
particular couple's alimony and property division are often based on
pragmatic considerations.
III. INCONSISTENCIES IN PROPERTY DIVISIONS AND ALIMONY
These pragmatic considerations just add to the confusion about why
there are property divisions and alimony and how the amounts allocated to
each spouse should be determined. In this section, the particular problems
4" Section 308(b)(1) of the Uniform Mariage and Divorce Act includes as a
factor in awarding alimony any provision for support of a child which includes a
sum for the custodian. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(b)(1), 9A
U.L.A. 347 (1987). However, most guidelines consider the direct costs of raising
a child and then divide that cost based on the parents' incomes and the custodial
arrangements. See Williams, supra note 46, at 97.
50 See CLARK, supra note 8, at 592.
51 See id.
52 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 71, 215 (1997).
" See CLARK, supra note 8, at 592.
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resulting in inconsistencies in property divisions and alimony are ad-
dressed.
A. Property Divisions
Inconsistencies occur in property divisions because of the lack of a
clear understanding of what is property and how it is affected by marriage.
This is especially important because the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act places the primary emphasis at divorce on the property division.54
Traditionally, the purpose of the property division was to give to each
spouse the property that he or she equitably owned, recognizing that in
marriage the title to property often does not correspond to the rights of
ownership.55 This apparently straightforward process has been applied in
an inconsistent manner. First, there are problems with the identification of
the assets that should be considered in the property division. Second,
inconsistencies exist in the consideration of what is separate, in contrast to
marital, property. Last, in many states, the criteria used to allocate the items
identified as property are so broad that virtually any outcome is legally
possible.56
1. What is Property?
While a common concern at divorce is ihe property division, the
statutes do not clearly define property. The equitable distribution statutes
in the vast majority of jurisdictions define "marital property," but usually
ignore the more basic definition of "property."57 When considering the
division of property upon the dissolution of marriage, the ALI Principles
defines marital and separate property, but not "property" itself.58 Further-
I Section 308(a) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act limits alimony to
two situations. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 347
(1987). The person receiving alimony must show that he or she does not have
sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable needs, and that he or she is
unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment or has
custody of a child whose circumstances make it appropriate that he or she not seek
ajob outside the home. See id.
See CLARK, supra note 8, at 593.
56 See id.
57 See Williard H. Da Silva, Property Subject to Equitable Distribution, in
VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY 18-4 (John P. McCahey &
Barbara E. Adelman eds., 1984).
58 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 90.
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more, the ALI Principles states that a definition of "property" would be
required
if the term was meant to have a special meaning different from its
meaning in other areas of the law, but no such special definition is
necessary or desirable. The most frequent occasion for debate over the
definition involves the law's treatment of earning capacity and goodwill.
But the characterization of these assets involves policy choices whose
analysis is not aided by appeal to a general definition of "property." The
definition of marital property must follow from the policy choice; the
policy choice is not determined by the definition. 9
Nothing could be further. from the truth. When people were making their
own financial arrangements at divorce, a clear definition of property was
not essential or, for that matter, very important. However, that is no longer
the case. There are numerous reasons why a clear understanding of what is
property and how it is affected by marriage is important. It is not an
acceptable conclusion that the law's treatment of earning capacity and
goodwill, for example, should be based on policy choices. If something is
an asset and therefore property, it should be recognized as such with the
normal standards for its identification and valuation. Public choices may
then determine whether there are reasons for modifying the general rules
for the allocation of property at divorce. Much of the confusion about how
earning capacity and professional goodwill should be treated at divorce is
due to the lack of a clear definition and understanding of property,
something that can be easily remedied using the language of the financial
and economic analysts who usually identify and value property.
Most fundamentally, the legal term "property" describes items that are
termed "assets" in the financial and economic literature.60 Rather than
relying on property as just another word for an asset, the courts have
classified items as property on an ad hoc and often inconsistent basis that
59 [d.
60 An asset is property that has value as measured by its ability to generate
future cash. See ALAN C. SHAPIRO, MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE § G-2 (1989).
A standard formula for the value of an asset (V) with a permanent annual payment
($N) when the relevant interest rate is i is V = $N/i. See PAUL SAMUELSON &
WILLIAM NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICs 248'(15th ed. 1995). An asset that will
generate annual payments of $100 forever is worth $1000 if the relevant rate of
interest is 10%. An asset exists and has value even though it cannot be sold. An
example of such an asset is an individual's income-earning capacity.
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includes a limited array of items.' Over time, the sources of individuals'
wealth-their property-have expanded from primarily tangible things, such
as stock certificates, cars, and houses, to intangible items such as the
individuals' income-earning capacities, pensions, and stock options. The
courts have slowly adapted to this new environment. Because many
divorces involving substantial propertyunder fault divorce were negotiated
with the parties reaching their own financial arrangements, litigation that
could have clarified the definition of property was seldom.
Divorce courts often resist expanding the definition of property to
include intangible rights by requiring that something have value in
exchange before it can be considered property.62 Some courts hold that the
owner must be able to sell or pledge an item for it to be property.63 Jn
addition, some courts have concluded that items that are property cannot
be contingent in any way that limits a spouse's rights in his or her spouse's
future earnings or pension. Some states have expanded the concept of
property to include some intangible items such as increased earning
capacity and pensions."4 In these states, the contingency of a right may not
eliminate the right from being property, but the contingency may limit its
value. Because the courts have been uncomfortable in radically changing
the definition of property, the change has been made by statute.65 In West
Virginia, for example, "marital property" includes "every valuable right
and interest, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible. 66
The definition of property used in most jurisdictions differs substan-
tially from the one used by economists and financial analysts. In economic
analysis, an asset exists and has value if it produces a future stream of
returns, no matter whether it can be exchanged. Exchangeability has
become a less common characteristic of assets because of the increase in
the wealth consisting of human capital, which describes the capitalized
value of the increased stream of earnings that will flow to an individual
6 Problems are often created when the courts address concepts from other
fields, but rely on their own expertise to define and evaluate the concepts. See
Allen M. Parkman, The Multiplier in English FatalAccident Cases: What Happens
When Judges Teach Judges Economics, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 187, 193-95
(1985).62 See OLDHAM, supra note 24, § 5.02[2], at 5-4.
63 See id.
6 See id. § 5.02[3], at 5-6.
61 See id.
6 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1 (1996).
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who has invested in skills or knowledge.67 In other words, human capital
is an asset owned by an individual. An asset exists and has value, not
because it can be exchanged for money, but because it will provide a
stream of future returns. This difference can be illustrated by considering
a share of common stock that has traditionally been recognized as property
and a medical education that has seldom been treated as property.6 8
Although a share of common stock can be exchanged, no rational investor
would pay a positive price for the common stock of a corporation that was
never expected to earn any profits or pay any dividends. Meanwhile,
medical school can be an attractive investment resulting in a valuable
asset-human capital-although the doctor cannot sell himself or herself or
the degree.69 An asset has value because of its future returns-both financial
and psychic-not because it can be exchanged.
Ourwealth orproperty consists of the assets that provide us with future
returns. Such property can consist of a house that could be converted into
rental value, stocks and bonds that will provide dividends and interest, and
the expected income stream that will provide compensation for our services
in the future. In contrast to a house, a share of common stock, or a bond,
the stream of future income from human capital cannot be sold. Conceptu-
ally, however, they are all assets or property.
2. Separate and Marital Property
Even with a broader recognition of property, there is still the question
of whether the property should be treated as separate or marital.70 As the
courts have expanded the definition of property, the analysis of separate
versus marital property has been flawed.7' The primary factors for
67 The primary source for the developing concept of human capital is GARY
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (3d ed. 1993). Numerous studies demonstrate the
importance of human capital in explaining earnings. See, e.g., Michael P. Keane
& Kenneth I. Wolpin, The CareerDecisions of YoungMen, 105 J. POL. ECON. 473
(1997).
68 See KRAUSE, supra note 3, at 453.
69 The doctor can, however, sell his or her services.
70 If enacted by the states, the Uniform Marital Property Act, drafted in 1983,
would effectively create a nationwide system of community property in which
separate property would be returned to its owner and community property shared
at divorce. See UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 10(b), 9A U.L.A. 35 (Supp.
1983).
71 Because of the lack of a clear understanding of property, injustices often
occur in property divisions under current legal standards. One reaction has been to
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determining how property should be treated are the date of acquisition and
the source of its funding. While a property's value is based on its future
returns, a property's acquisition is based on investments. 2 Investments in
physical and financial assets and their acquisition can usually be traced to
specific transactions.73 A car purchased before marriage is usually separate
property, while a house purchased during marriage will usually be marital
property.74 This process is much less straightforward with human capital.
The investments that create human capital occur over a long period and
take many different forms, making the partition between separate and
marital property more difficult. We all have the innate ability to earn an
income based on our natural intelligence and strength. Additional
investments in education and training assist us in increasing our income-
earning capacity. In other words, these investments create human capital.
The question then is whether investments occurred before marriage,
resulting in separate property, or after marriage, resulting in marital
property.
This type of analysis is totally lacking in the cases in which the courts
have recognized human capital as property. Professional goodwill, which
is the extension of business goodwill to professionals, was one of the first
examples of the courts' recognition of human capital.75 In addition to the
convert separate property to marital property over the course of a marriage. See
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, § 4.18, at 238; Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing
Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 159
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Henna Hill Kay eds., 1991) [hereinafter DIVORCE
REFORM].
72 Investment is the flow of expenditures devoted to projects producing goods
which are not intended for immediate consumption. These investment projects may
take the form of adding to both physical and human capital as well as inventories.
See DAVID W. PEARCE, THEMITDICTIONARY OFMODERN ECONOMICS 216 (3d ed.
1986).
"3 The ALI Principles recognizes the importance of sacrifices as the basis for
separate property becoming marital property. This occurs when either spouse
devotes substantial time to the property's management or preservation. See ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, § 4.05(1), at 112.
74Property acquired during marriagewith separate property funds will generally
continue to be separate property.
75 See Allen M. Parkman, A Systematic Approach to Valuing the Goodwill of
Professional Practices, in VALUING PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES AND LICENSE 6-1
(Ronald L. Brown ed., 3d ed. 1998); Allen M. Parkman, The Treatment of Pro-
fessional Goodwill in Divorce Proceedings, 18 FAM. L.Q. 213, 222 (1984)
[hereinafter Parkman, Professional Goodwill].
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standard method used for calculating business goodwill when a business is
not being sold (the capitalization of enhanced earnings), the court in Hurley
v. Hurley6 recognized a range of factors with no relevance to financial
analysis such as "the length of time the professional has been practicing,
his comparative success, his age and health, and any past profits of the
practice. Attention should also be given to the physical and fixed resources
of the practice."" Also, if professional goodwill existed, the Hurley court
assumed-with no further analysis-that it was marital property even though
important investments may have occurred before the marriage." A given
professional can have high income for a variety of reasons that have
nothing to do with his or her marriage. People who take larger risks and
work harder expect to earn higher incomes. Also, people earn higher
incomes because of investments made in them by their parents and society.
Professional goodwill has also been extended to celebrities.79 Since
methods of valuation are even more difficult in that context, the results
have been even more inconsistent. When valuing celebrity goodwill, courts
have often used formulae which do not have widespread acceptance in the
academic community. For example, one court opined that twenty-five
percent of gross earnings for three of the previous five years represented a
good estimate of the celebrity's goodwill.80
Even when the courts recognize a degree as marital property, which is
evidence of human capital rather than human capital itself, the method
accepted for valuation is flawed. In O'Brien v. O'Brien,1 the New York
court awarded Mrs. O'Brien forty percent of Dr. O'Brien's enhanced
earning power based on the present value of the difference between the
average income of a college graduate and that of a general surgeon
calculated over Dr. O'Brien's work life expectancy."2 It is inappropriate to
base enhanced earnings for a surgeon on those of the average college
graduate because the people who are admitted and eventually graduate
from medical school are presumably more intelligent and ambitious than
the average college graduate. Therefore, they would be expected to have a
6 Hurley v. Hurley, 615 P.2d 256 (N.M. 1980), overruled on other grounds by
Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 637 P.2d 564 (N.M. 1981).
771d. at 259.
78 See id.79 See Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988), aff'd,
557 A.2d 1040 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).8oSee Piscopo, 557 A.2d at 1041.
81 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
12Seeid. at 714.
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higher income than the average college graduate even if they had not gone
to medical school. In addition, since there are no arms-length transactions
as normally exist in financial markets, the choice of a forty percent equity
interest is totally arbitrary.
The inconsistencies created by the law in this area can be illustrated by
considering parental investments. The parents might invest in a portfolio
of common stocks for their child. If the child marries, devotes very little
time to managing the portfolio, does not commingle it with other marital
assets, and then divorces, in most jurisdictions, the portfolio will be
returned to the child as separate property. 3 Alternatively, if the parents
invest their time and money before marriage providing the child with a
superior education resulting in a higher than average income after marriage,
the result could be the recognition of professional goodwill as marital
property if there is a divorce and an award of alimony.
3. How Should Property be Allocated?
Because of the limited number of items considered property and the
lack of a clear understanding of what should be treated as marital property,
a straightforward approach that would return each parties' separate
property and allocate the marital property equally would commonly result
in patently unjust results. Therefore, the property division statutes in many
states include a list of factors to be considered by the courts, including the
financial and nonfinancial contributions of both spouses to the marriage
and the postdivorce economic circumstances and needs of the spouses. 4
The recommended alternative section ofthe Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act concerning the disposition of property calls for the court to allocate all
property of the spouses, no matter how it was acquired, based on a
substantial list of factors.85 In making its apportionment, the court is
directed to
consider the duration of the marriage, any prior marriage of either party,
any antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age, health, station,
83 See CLARK, supra note 8, at 595. The ALI Principles, in contrast, would
gradually convert some separate property into marital property in marriages of long
duration, in part because the ALI Principles asserts that the spouses usually start
treating the property that way. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, § 4.18 cmt. a, at
240.
84 See CLARK, supra note 8, at 594.
85 See UNF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 347 (1987).
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occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employabil-
ity, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provi-
sions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to mainte-
nance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets
and income.86
The court is also instructed to "consider the contribution or dissipation of
each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in
value of the respective estates, and the contribution of a spouse as a
homemaker or to the family unit.""7 The other alternative version of this
section, which was included based on the concerns of the community
property states, is also ambiguous. After assigning each spouse's separate
property to that spodse, the court is directed to allocate the marital property
after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital
property, including contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) duration of the marriage; and
(4) economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of
property is to be effective, including the desirability of awarding the
family home or the right to live therein for a reasonable period to the
spouse having custody of any children.88
These factors permit the courts to make almost any allocation that they
choose. Spouses with similar fact situations can reasonably expect
contradictory decisions in different courts or in the same court at different
times. Given this broad discretion, courts in both common law and
community property states have tended to divide the items recognized as
marital property equally.8 9
In sum, courts have not developed a systematic understanding of what
is property based upon the perspective of the experts who deal with that
question. Even with the limited range of items considered property, the
methods used for its allocation and evaluation are often arbitrary.
86 Id.
87 id.
8S8 Id.
89 See LEGAL GUIDE TO MARRIAGE, supra note 23, at 58.
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B. Alimony
The logic and purpose of alimony have been unclear for a long time.
In the United States, the practice of granting alimony in conjunction with
a divorce was adapted from English law. Prior to the 1857 reform of the
English divorce laws, most divorces were handled by the ecclesiastical
courts, which gave divorces that authorized the husband and wife to live
apart while otherwise continuing their marriage.9 The alimony that was
awarded by these courts merely continued the husband's duty to support
the wife. This was especially important at that time because the employ-
ment opportunities and remarriage prospects for women were severely
restricted. In addition, a wife turned over control of her property to her
husband when she married.
In contrast, absolute divorces were available in most of the United
States from an early date. Therefore, although the use of alimony in
England "served the plain and intelligible purpose of providing support for
wives living apart from their husbands," 91 the rationale for awarding it in
the United States for absolute divorces was much less clear.92 As noted by
Homer Clark in his treatise on family law:
If we do not know what we are trying to accomplish by giving a spouse
alimony, we will not easily be able to decide whether it should be granted
in a particular case, or, if granted in what amount. The situation is not
clarified by statutes which vary widely in listing the relevant facts to be
considered, and by appellate decisions which likewise state or assume that
alimony has many different functions. The idea that alimony is a
substitute for the traditional duty of a husband to support his wife still has
great currency in the cases but today alimony can be only partially
explained on this ground.93
As a result, alimony is awarded in a very haphazard and inconsistent
manner at divorce.9 It is granted in less than one-fifth of all divorces and
' In England prior to 1857, an absolute divorce could only be obtained through
an act of Parliament and, therefore, was very uncommon. See CLARK, supra note
8, at 620.
91 Id.92 See id.
93 Id. at 641.
94 See generally Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in
Search ofa Theory, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 498-506 (1988); Ellman, supra note
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in less than half of divorces terminating marriages of more than fifteen
years.95 Even when mothers are limited in their ability to work because they
have custody of minor children, alimony as distinguished from child
support is awarded in less than one-quarter of cases. 6 Recognizing the lack
of a clear logic behind alimony, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
restricts the award of alimony to a spouse who has neither property nor
income sufficient for his or her support, then lists six factors to be
considered in arriving at an equitable award.97
The attempt of the ALI Principles to bring consistency to what has
been called spousal support or alimony will not fulfill its promise."
Recognizing the lack of agreement regarding the purpose of alimony, the
ALI Principles recommends a policy of compensatory spousal payments
8, at4.
95 See WEITzMAN, supra note 30, at 169.
96 See id. at 186.
9' Section 308. [Maintenance]
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or
maintenance following a decree of dissolution of the marriage by a court
which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, only if it finds
that the spouse seeking the maintenance:
(1) lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or
is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it
appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment
outside the home.
(b) The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time
the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after
considering all relevant factors including;
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
marital property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his needs
independently, and the extent to which a provision for support of a child
living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse
seeking maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet
his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 446 (1987).
98 See generally ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8.
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based on losses rather than meeting needs.99 These payments are to cover
"financial claims between spouses arising in the dissolution of their
marriage, other than claims for a share in their property or for support of
their children."'" Because of the lack of a clear understanding of property,
the losses covered are not recognized as property claims, which the losses
are in most cases. The ad hoc nature of these provisions is evidenced by
some awards being fixed at dissolution while others can be modified and
terminated with remarriage or death. Compensation is provided for the loss
of marital living standard,' forthe loss in earning capacity incurred by the
primary caretaker,' 2 for the loss of earning capacity arising from the care
of third parties,0 3 for contributions to the other spouse's education or
training,'14 and for the restoration of the premarital living standard after a
short marriage. 05 Compensatory spousal payments for a loss in living
standard or in earning capacity, like alimony, generally end with remar-
riage or death"° and can be modified.0 7 In these cases, this compensation
is based on a sharing of the spouse's postdissolution incomes, which often
has only a very limited link to the loss incurred.' 8 Working at home during
" See id. § 5.02, at 259.
'00Id. § 5.01(1), at 257.
1o See id. § 5.05, at 280. Compensation, without any evidence of the type of
sacrifice covered by section 5.06 has caused some commentators to call for the
abolition of this section. See Oldham, supra note 39, at 816.
'
2 See ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 5.06, at 317.
103 See id. § 5.12, at 380.
104 See id. § 5.15, at 383.
105 See id. § 5.16, at 394.
,o6 See id. § 5.08, at 350.
'
07 See id. § 5.09, at 357.
108 Compensation based on the parties' disparate financial capacity is deter-
mined by applying a marriage duration factor to "the difference between the
incomes the spouses are expected to have after dissolution," id. § 5.05(3), at 272,
while compensation for the primary caretaker's residual loss in earning capacity is
determined by applying a "child care durational factor to the difference between
the incomes that spouses are expected to have after dissolution." Id. § 5.06(4), at
318. Another concern is based on the majority of divorces being initiated by the
lower income spouse, with the result that the person who initiated the divorce is
rewarded with an income transfer from the spouse who wanted the marriage to
continue. See Sanford L. Braver et al., Who Divorced Whom? Methodological and
Theoretical Issues, 20 3. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (1993). Still, a sharing of
postdissolution income is popular among many academics. See, e.g., Sally F.
Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the CaseforPermanent Alimony, 27 J. FAM. L.
351,365 (1988-89); Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and GenderJustice, 67 N.C. L.
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marriage is only a basis for compensation if the couple has children." 9 If
a talented woman marries a man with lower earnings and they elect for her
to work in the home (even without children), thereby limiting her career,
she may not receive compensation if the marriage is dissolved. This is true
even if she has to reenter the labor force at a much lower income level than
she would have had without the disruption in her employment. Moreover,
if the primary caretaker has a higher potential income after dissolution than
the other spouse, the primary caretaker will receive no compensation for
any reduction in his or her income due to his or her working in the home.
Maintaining the ad hoc nature of the law in this area, the ALI Principles
notes that it is contrary to existing law for the lower income spouse to
compensate the higher income spouse even though it is that spouse who
incurred a sacrifice because of the marriage."0 Sacrificing or limiting a
career affects that spouse's human capital and therefore should be
recognized in the property division.
Certain remedies acceptedby the ALI Principles, such as compensation
for losses for investments in the other spouse's earning capacity and the
ability to recover their premarital living standard after the dissolution of a
short marriage, are more directly related to the actual loss incurred. They
cannot be modified and do not terminate with remarriage or death."' In
many ways, these provisions cover the effects of marriage on human
capital that would be more systematically covered in the property division.
The attraction of this process is its predictability,"' but the results are
arbitrary outcomes and perverse incentives. In many cases, people are
randomly rewarded for having been fortunate enough to have married
someone who eventually has a high income. If the high income was an
incentive for the marriage and the lower income spouse sacrificed the
opportunity to have married someone equally successful, then that loss
should be clearly stated. If the higher income was unexpected and therefore
not the basis of the marriage, then to reward the lower income spouse may
be appealing, but should be recognized as capricious.
The more telling criticism is the effect on incentives. Without a
premarital agreement, individuals with the potential for a high income have
REv. 1103 (1989); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A
Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts andDissociation UnderNo-
Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 67, 139 (1993).
109 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, § 5.06 cmt. a, at 335.
'0See id. § 5.06 cmt. d, at 325.
.' See id. § 5.17, at 406.
112 See id. § 5.06 cmt. e, at 326.
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incentives to avoid marriage, while those with a low potential income have
incentives to pursue marriage for the wrong reasons. After dissolution, both
spouses have incentives to limit their incomes because they are sharing it
with each other under circumstances in which they would have made their
own arrangements if the sharing was voluntary. The lower income spouse
has incentives to emphasize the need for rehabilitation resulting in zero or
negative income even when the rehabilitation is not productive. Mean-
while, the spouse with the higher income has incentives to avoid income
opportunities. In addition, incentives to move on with one's life are also
restricted as the payments can end if the lower income spouse remarries.
These examples provide an introduction to the next section of this
article, which argues that the current distinction between property divisions
and alimony and the proposed distinction of the ALI Principles between
property and compensatory spousal payments lack consistency. Consis-
tency and improved incentives can be created by recognizing that the
financial arrangements at divorce should be based on the debts incurred
during the marriage.
IV. DEBT AS THE BASIS FOR FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AT DIVORCE
The financial obligations at divorce should be based on debts incurred
during marriage. People make choices due to their being married and some
of these choices result in debts, which are obligations of one person to pay
or compensate another.11 Of course, if the marriage ends due to a spouse's
death, the recognition of these debts is usually not important." 4 The same
cannot be said for divorce. At that point, the most certain issues are what
is his and what is hers. Consistency would be improved by replacing the
current system of property divisions and alimony with one based on debt,
which would be an extended version of the current property divisions.
This can be illustrated using an economic perspective, which has
become increasingly popular for analyzing marriage and the family." 5
1 See STEVEN H. GiFis, LAW DICTIONARY 53 (1975).
.14 The spouse who should be compensated for a debt is either dead or being
compensated under probate law. If the compensation is inadequate, that is an issue
for probate courts to resolve.
"' Much of this work can be traced to Gary Becker, the University of Chicago
Nobel Prize-winning economist-sociologist. His work is summarized in BECKER,
supra note 34. While Becker relies on a neoclassical economic framework, other
authors have analyzed the family using a game theoretical approach. See W. KEITH
BRYANT, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF THE HOUSEHOLD 217 (1990). For an
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While accepting love and sexual attraction as essential for family forma-
tion, this literature also analyzes the family as an institution consisting of
individuals who respond to changing incentives based on costs and
benefits. In economics, a cost is associated with a sacrifice rather than just
the narrow meaning of a money outlay. For example, marriage imposes a
cost on the spouses because they have sacrificed the opportunity to have
married someone else.
Spouses make sacrifices during marriage that benefit other family
members. While altruism can be a pertinent force in close relationships,
economic analysis suggests that strong incentives for making these
sacrifices are the benefits that the spouses expect, often in the future, in
return. The essence of marriage consists of reciprocal arrangements. While
neither washing the family car nor cooking dinner will result in positive net
benefits for that person, the combination of activities will result in positive
net benefits for the couple. Neither activity is done in isolation, but is part
of the reciprocal arrangements of marriage. One was done in anticipation
of the other. The car wash and the meal are activities that are reasonably
contemporaneous, so the spouses may not be concerned about whether the
reciprocal actions will occur. However, the benefits may occur long after
the costs were incurred, such as when educational support is provided by
spouses, resulting in a debt of the beneficiaries to the persons incurring the
cost. These costs, which produce many of the gains from marriage and
family, are more likely to be incurred if there is a reasonable assurance that
the people making the sacrifice will be compensated. This, in effect, creates
creditor/debtor relationships. The debts incurred during marriage need to
be clearly defined, along with the determination of whether they are
extinguished by remarriage.
If the likelihood increases that compensation will not be received for
sacrifices, then spouses are discouraged from making welfare-enhancing
decisions for which the benefits exceed the costs." 6 Spouses often make
economic analysis of the family using a more mathematical approach, see
ALESSANDRO CIGNO, ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY (1991).
116 Because no-fault divorce permits unilateral divorce often accompanied by
limited financial compensation for women who have limited their careers to benefit
their families, married women have been forced to take steps to protect themselves
from the potential adverse effects of divorce. Since they are acting in their best
interest rather than that of their families, this lack of protection for their
investments often induces them to make inefficient decisions for their families
because the benefits do not exceed the costs. See Allen M. Parkman, Why Are
Married Women Working So Hard?, 18 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 41 (forthcoming
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sacrifices that may not be in their narrowly defined best interest at that
time, but are incurred because they are viewed as in the best interest of the
marriage and their best interest in the long ran. If these sacrifices are not
made, the overall quality of the marriage is reduced. For example, a
couple's children might benefit from one parent limiting a career to provide
important childcare services. The parents might, however, be reluctant to
incur the potential cost of limiting a career if they are not sure that they will
be compensated financially and emotionally by the other spouse and the
children.' 17 If there is a divorce, this lack of compensation can be due to the
failure of the financial and custodial arrangements to systematically
recognize the costs that the parents have incurred." 8 In addition, even if
these costs are recognized in a property division, these costs might be
avoided if an ex-spouse files for bankruptcy. As a consequence, the parents
focus on their careers to the detriment of their children.
Costs are incurred during marriage in a number of situations for which
compensationusing a debt perspective would be appropriate if the marriage
is dissolved. When people marry, they sacrifice the opportunity to marry
someone else. The couple may choose to have children recognizing the
future time, money, and emotional costs that the children will require. The
spouses may sacrifice current consumption to save, thereby accumulating
marital property. To accommodate their spouse and children, spouses may
limit their career, p6tentially reducing their future income. Finally, spouses
may sacrifice some of their earnings to finance the education of their
spouse.
All of these sacrifices should be viewed as potentially creating debts,
either to the other spouse or to their children, if the marriage is dissolved.
A discussion of these debts follows.
A. Alimony
The rationale for alimony or spousal support would be more consis-
tently related to the other financial arrangements at divorce if it were
recognized that alimony or spousal support should be based only on the
sacrificed opportunity to have married someone else under circumstances
that resulted in a debt. When the primary roles available for adult women
were housewife and mother, a woman's chief cost of divorce was the
1998) [hereinafter Parkman, Married Women].
117 See id.
"
8 See Parkman, Unilateral Divorce, supra note 30, at 676.
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sacrificed opportunity to have married someone else.I19 This cost could be
substantial because of women's limited opportunities for remarriage and
employment. In 1900, only three percent of brides were divorced.2
Employment opportunities were also restricted, as only twenty percent of
women were in the labor force and that percentage declined with age to less
than fourteen percent for women between forty-five and sixty-four years
old.' Alimony, therefore, served the purpose of compensating women for
the costs associated with marrying a particular man. Still, alimony seldom
maintainedthe same lifestyle available during marriage, creating incentives
for both spouses to consider marriage carefully. In effect, both spouses
shared the cost of repaying the debt to the wife who faced this sacrifice.
The cost was shared because the husband paid alimony, but the wife could
not anticipate an income similar to the one during marriage. Still, in the
negotiated settlements that often occurred under the fault grounds for
divorce, the legal criteria for alimony often were secondary to the practical
outcomes that were driven by tax considerations and the bargaining
positions of the spouses.
To the extent that alimony was awarded earlier in this century, it was
reasonable to assume that the women-except for this marriage-would have
married someone similar to the person that they married. As such, the cost
of the divorce and the resulting debt was a lifestyle similar to the one
enjoyed during the marriage. Since the debt was tied to the dissolution of
a marriage, it was logical for the debt to be repaid with periodic payments
that could be modified and would end with remarriage or death. This was
probably more important when it was likely that a woman's family was
closely involved in her marriage decision and she was more likely to marry
within her social class. 122
"' See Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage
and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, 873 (1988).
120 Cf ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 27 (1992). As
late as the 1920s, most people who remarried were more likely to be widowed than
divorced. Since then, the percentage of brides who later divorced has increased
dramatically from 9% of brides in 1930 to 32% of brides in 1987. In that year, 91%
of people remarrying were divorced with only 9% being widowed. See id.
121 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 132.
" In colonial America, parents influenced their children's marriages in
significant ways, most importantly in the matter of consent. Minor children were
required to obtain consent, while most adult children also sought consent to
preserve hopes for inheritance as well as to maintain filial affection. See WALL,
supra note 37, at 49; see generally EDWARD SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN FAMILY (1975).
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Gradually, alimony based on a lost lifestyle became less appropriate.
As women became more independent, the likelihood increased that a
marriage would occur across income classes. The assumption that a
woman-except for this marriage-would have married someone with an
income similar to her husband's became less reasonable. A divorce also
had a smaller impact on women's income because of their increased
employment opportunities. The labor force participation rate of married
women increased from thirty-two percent in 1960 to sixty-one percent in
1994.12 This trend was especially dramatic for married mothers with
children less than six years of age, whose labor force participation rate
increased from nineteen percent to sixty-two percent over the same
period.'24 To the extent that marriage is a preferred state for women, the
cost of divorce increased because the likelihood of remarriage had fallen
for divorced women. Among those women divorced from 1965 to 1969,
seventy-three percent remarried within five years. That percentage fell to
less than fifty percent for those divorced from 1980 to 1984.125 Therefore,
the loss due to divorce is less a financial one than a psychological one.
126
Alimony, especially under the ALI Principles, has become more an
arbitrary reallocation of income than a basis for compensating spouses for
their loss. Imposing the burden of this reallocation on the higher income
spouse if a marriage is dissolved seems out of line with the shift to no-fault
divorce grounds. Moreover, compensating someone for the lost opportunity
to have married someone else presents the courts with a difficult or
impossible task. Such a task might be better served by recognizing it as an
exceptional case, thereby encouraging the affected people to make their
own arrangements using a premarital agreement. A more appropriate
concern is compensation for spouses who incur a sacrifice by limiting a
career for which periodic payments extinguished by remarriage or death is
not an appropriate solution. If the court were to determine that alimony in
such a case is appropriate because the spouses recognized that one was
making a major sacrifice by marrying, the resulting debt should be shared
by the spouses and terminate at remarriage or death. This is the only debt
that should end with remarriage.
Current reforms are not an improvement over existing standards. A
formula such as the one proposed by the ALI Principles that transfers
income from the higher to the lower income spouse after dissolution just
123 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1995, supra note 1, at 405.
'
24 See id. at 406.
'25 See id. at 407.
,26 See id. at 104 tbl. 147.
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because they were married is highly arbitrary. This transfer is independent
of whether the lower income spouse made any sacrifices for the benefit of
the marriage. The ALI Principles covers such sacrifices under com-
pensation for a primary caretaker's residual loss in earning capacity.
The ALI Principles states that this remedy is based on "compensation for
loss" rather than "relief of need."'27 Imposing this loss on the higher
income spouse is based on "the unfair allocation of the financial losses
arising from the marital failure."' 28 By shifting the rhetoric of alimony,
now called compensation payments, from "need" to "loss" does not make
the illogical logical. Unless there is a debt, the payment is essentially a
penalty.
A difference in incomes after divorce alone is not a rational basis for
compensation between ex-spouses. People have different incomes for a
variety of reasons, many of which have nothing to do with their marriage.
Two obvious factors are intelligence and diligence. Earnings are also
affected by the attractiveness of occupations, with riskier and less
comfortable jobs often paying more. 129 Finally, earnings vary because of
workers' inherent characteristics such as race and sex. 30
Of particular relevance to marriage is the fact that women continue to
earn less than men. In 1992, women employed full-time and year-round
made $25,337 in contrast to the $37,469 earned by similarly situated
127 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 261.
128 Id. When the income that was once available to one household is divided
between two households, both households have to be worse off. The only issue is
which one is worse. Numerous citations have been made to Lenore Weitzman's
conclusion that divorced men were 42% better off after divorce and women and
children were 73% worse off. See WEITZMAN, supra note 30, at 323. While
Weitzman's research has been questioned by many authors, the most systematic
attacks and discussions are found in Richard R. Peterson, A Reevaluation of the
Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. Soc. REv. 528 (1996); Lenore
Weitzman, The Economic Consequences ofDivorce Are Still Unequal: Comment
on Peterson, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 537 (1996); and Richard R. Peterson, Statistical
Errors, Faulty Conclusions, Misguided Policy: Reply to Weitzman, 61 AM. SOC.
REv. 539 (1996).
'
2 9 See RANDALL K. FILER ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY 372
(1996).
3I See id. at 525. Pay differentials among starting salaries for men and women
disappear when mathematical skills are taken into account. See Thomas Daymont
& Paul J. Andrisani, Job Preferences, College Major and the Gender Gap in
Earnings, 19 J. HUM. RESOURCES 408 (1984).
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men.' Without evidence that a woman's lower income is the result of
sacrifices made for the benefit of the family, it is highly arbitrary to impose
this cost on the higher income spouse. Except for sacrifices made for the
benefit of the family, the reasons for these wage differentials between men
and women lie outside the family. Therefore, the solution must also come
from outside the family. The wage gap is decreasing as women have
approached equality with men by entering similar occupations and
maintaining a stronger attachment to the labor force.' Mandatory
compensation from higher to lower income spouses just because they were
married discourages higher income individuals from marrying and creates
disincentives after divorce for the spouses to get on with their lives.
B. Child Support
While child support has not been a major focus of this article, child
support is consistent with the debt framework for the financial arrange-
ments at divorce. Child support should be based on a debt of the parents to
their children. The costs of children continue even if the marriage is
dissolved as the children still need to be fed, clothed, and nurtured. Parents
historically had children because children were a source of financial
support, love, and companionship. More recently, the financial incentives
for parenthood have essentially been eliminated. Still, in return for the
anticipatedbenefits of parenthood, societyimposes ajoint obligation onthe
parents to support their minor children. Child support guidelines determine
how parents share those costs. However, because the data used to establish
the child support guidelines in most states only consider the costs of raising
a child, the financial obligations of the nonresidential parent tend to be
understated. Some costs incurred by the residential parent, such as
employment limitations, are also not recognized.' These costs are more
appropriately recognized as a child support obligation than as alimony,
especially because alimony ends with remarriage, but these costs continue
and, therefore, so should the payments from the nonresidential parent. In
"I See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POP-
ULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-60-184, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES
AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992, at 100-07 tbl. 26 (1993) [hereinafter
MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS] (listing the mean income of year-round, full-
time workers of all races).
13 See June O'Neill & Solomon Polachek, Why The Gender Gap in Wages
Narrowed in the 1980s, 11 .LAB. ECoN. 205 (1993).
1 See ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 136
(1992).
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effect, when parents conceive children, the parents incur an obligation-a
debt-to provide their children with support during their minority with the
cost being shared by the parents. The contribution of the parents to these
costs can be time as well as money.
C. Marital Property
Marriage is a joint endeavor in which the spouses share their earnings,
skills, and energy. One result is the accumulation of marital property,
which is a debt of the couple to themselves as individuals. Marital property
is usually accumulated by a couple saving as they sacrifice current
consumption. 3 4 Basically, couples have two options for their after-tax
income: they can spend it or save it. By saving, they are able to acquire
property such as mutual funds or a house from which they expect future
benefits. Saving is usually a sacrifice because people generally prefer to
have the immediate benefits of consumption. Both spouses make a sacrifice
in anticipation of the future benefits from the saving. Calling marital
property a debt would not change the outcome for the items currently
recognized as property from what usually happens in most states because
the community property perspective has tended to become the norm. After
the marital property is identified, the marital property tends to be divided
equally. 35 From the perspective argued here, marital property is based on
a debt from the couple to themselves as individuals that is satisfied by
giving them equal shares of the property. Focusing on when sacrifices
occurred would aid in determining whether property was separate and
should be returned to its owner or was marital and the basis of a debt
obligation. 36
D. Enhanced Earning Capacity
Another obvious debt occurs when a spouse makes sacrifices to
increase the income-earning capacity of the other spouse. 3 7 At marriage,
"' Wealth from gifts and bequests is usually treated as separate property rather
than as marital property and, therefore, is not divided at divorce. UNIF. MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 alt. A, 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1987).
131 See CLARK, supra note 8, at 595.
36 These sacrifices can be of time as well as money. Therefore, the spouses'
managing of property acquired before marriage converts some of its value into
marital property in a manner similar to the conversion that should occur if the
spouses made mortgage payments.
3 ' In section 4.07 of the ALI Principles, an increase in earning capacity is not
the basis for aproperty claim at divorce. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, § 4.07,
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a spouse has an income-earning capacity which has a value based on that
individual's anticipated income. This capacity is very similar to a portfolio
of stocks owned at that time and therefore should be treated as separate
property. Sacrifices, or investments, can occur during marriage that
increase that income-earning capacity, thereby creating a debt obligation.
An obvious example is education.' Spouses usually contribute their
earnings to the enhancement of their family's welfare. Most products and
services purchased during marriage are for the benefit of both spouses and
their children. However, some of one spouse's earnings may be used to
increase the income-earning capacity of the other spouse, especially
through additional education. Usually the intention is to make an invest-
ment rather than to confer a gift because the expectation is that the
increased future earnings will benefit the entire family, including the
supporting spouse. Funds are sacrificed that could be used for current
consumption. If the marriage is dissolved before the supporting spouse has
received a reasonable return on the investment, there is a debt of the
student spouse to the supporting spouse. The amount of the uncompensated
debt should be based on the costs incurred due to the education, which
include the direct outlays for books, tuition, the student's living expenses,
and any sacrificed income of the student spouse.
This approach is preferable to giving the supporting spouse an equity
interest in the student spouse based on a share of the student spouse's
enhanced earning capacity. Fundamentally, treating the support as a debt
is more attractive because the funds probably replaced student loans. In
addition, there is no systematic method for determining an appropriate
equity interest. When an equity interest is acquired in a commercial setting,
there is an arms-length transaction establishing the share of the profits
going to each participant. Without an arms-length transaction, any
determination of the appropriate shares of the spouses is arbitrary, which
is something better avoided.
at 146. However, such an increase can be the basis for a claim for compensatory
payments under section 5.05. See id. § 5.05, at 280-81. These payments are based
on the difference in the incomes of the spouses after dissolution rather than any
analysis of the actual effect of the marriage on their respective earning capacities.
I A more systematic approach to the costs incurred by the supporting spouse
would recognize more than just the direct costs of the education such as books,
tuition, and living expenses. A major cost of the education is the income sacrificed
by the student spouse, which is a cost that is shared by the spouses. See Allen M.
Parkman, An Investment Approach to Valuing Spousal Support of Education, in
VALUING PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES AND LICENSES 18-1 to 18-25 (Ronald L.
Brown ed., 2d ed. Supp. 1994).
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Student spouses should be responsible for the debt even if it does not
result in a higher income. Normally, the education increases the student's
income providing the funds for repayment. Even if the student's income
does not increase, the education may have been viewed as an enjoyable
experience by the student, which is hardly a reasonable basis for permitting
the student to avoid repayment. Moreover, if the education did not result
in a substantial increase in the student's income, the student was in a better
position to be aware of that possibility and should be the one to incur that
cost. The bottom line is that by making educational support the debt of a
student spouse, it is more likely that education will only be pursued if it is
expected to produce positive returns either in terms of a higher income or
an enjoyable experience.
Another form of enhanced earning capacity is professional goodwill,
which provides a case study in the lack of consistency currently occurring
in property divisions.'39 Goodwill can be a valuable asset of a business
reflecting the enhanced earnings of the business due to a smooth organiza-
tion or return customers. 140 If the value of the business increases during
marriage, that value should be recognized as marital property. Goodwill
was expandedto professionals inpart because of the obvious injustices that
were occurring in financial arrangements in divorces involving professional
spouses. A high income professional could divorce, leaving a spouse with
limited compensation because the property division was small, alimony
was for a limited duration, and there was no child support. Although the
process was initiated with good intentions, professional goodwill has been
applied in a highly arbitrary manner to professionals and celebrities, but not
to other types of careers.' 4' The fi-amework used in these situations often
violates basic financial principles.
In goodwill cases, confusion occurs when an increase in income is
interpreted as an increase in wealth. An asset has value because of the
return that it provides its owner, such as income. Income is a flow over
13' The ALI Principles discusses the difficulty of measuring the goodwill of a
professional business without clearly noting the confusion in the law between the
goodwill of the business and the goodwill of the professional in the business. See
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 152. The relevant question is whether the
earnings of either have increased during the marriage compared to those that could
have been expected prior to the marriage. See Parkman, Professional Goodwill,
supra note 75, at 222.
'
40 See PAUL H. WALGENBACH & ERNEST I. HANSON, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
371 (6th ed. 1990).
,4' See Parkman, Human Capital, supra note 11, at 150.
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time, while an asset is a stock at a moment in time. When transactions
exist, as they do for most tangible property, these transactions provide a
basis for determining the property's value. That is not true with human
capital. A person can have a low income but own substantial wealth in the
form of human capital. Think about a fourth-year medical student who is
probably experiencing a negative cash flow. The present value of that
person's future income stream is substantial, as that person already
possesses substantial human capital. The courts have interpreted an
increase in income during marriage as evidence of an increase in marital
property. 42 However, if the increase was one that could have been expected
at the time of marriage, the value of the underlying human capital has not
changed in value. If the income that occurs could have been expected, then
wealth does not change. For example, a stock price rises in 1995 because
of higher earnings expected in 1997. In 1997, those higher earnings occur,
but there is no reason to expect the stock price to change. Anticipated
future earnings only create marital property when they are expected to
increase beyond the level that could have been expected at marriage due to
efforts made during the marriage.
For a spouse to make a claim on enhanced earning capacity at divorce,
there should be evidence of that spouse having made some sacrifices. The
most obvious examples will be when that spouse has provided educational
support, but sacrifices can occur when a spouse's efforts are instrumental
in his or her spouse's success. While not sacrificing her career, a wife may
incur costs entertaining her husband's clients and superiors. 143 Because the
effect of these activities on a career is difficult to determine, they should
be scrutinized closely. Consistency, however, would be increased by
142 InElkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), opera singer
Frederica von Stade's annual income rose from $2250 to $621,878 over the course
of her 17-year marriage. However, most of the important factors that lead to her
success were already in place at the time of her marriage, and there was no
evidence that her husband's actions had any significant effect on. her ultimate
success. See id. at 904-05. In other words, if the income that she earned after
marriage was similar to the one that could have been expected at marriage, then her
human capital was in place at the time of the marriage and therefore should be
treated as separate property. See Parkman, Human Capital, supra note 11, at 167.
143 Relying on the equitable distribution statute in Connecticut, Loma Wendt
made that argument during her divorce from General Electric executive Gary
Wendt. See Maggie Gallagher, A Corporate Wife Earns Her Share of the Profits,
USA TODAY, May 19, 1997, at 23A. Later developments in this case are discussed
in Betsy Morris, It's Her Job Too, FORTUNE, Feb. 2, 1998, at 65.
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considering all effects of marriage that enhance a spouse's income, rather
than just the educational support considered in the ALI Principles.'" These
debts should not be affected by remarriage or death.
E. Diminished Earnings Capacity
Diminishment in earning capacities occurring during marriage is not
recognized systematically at divorce.'45 Even though there are financial
arrangements at divorce, people want to believe that marriage is fundamen-
tally a romantic institution. From that perspective, when love dies, people
should be permitted to go their separate ways with a minimum of interfer-
ence.'46 Slowly, it has been recognized that behind the basic attraction
between men and women is the fact that marriage is also a pragmatic
institution in which spouses usually assume more specialized roles. 47 This
specialization can result in a diminished earning capacity for a spouse and,
therefore, a debt of the marriage to that spouse.
Each spouse had human capital based on their income-earning capacity
at marriage that was an asset that should be viewed as separate property.
The spouses may decide that the marriage benefits from one of them
providing services in the home or making career decisions that will result
in that spouse's failure to maintain the value of his or her human capital by
'44See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, § 5.15, at 383.
"' Some authors have seen enhanced and diminished earning capacities as
alternative approaches to the same problem. See Herna Hill Kay, Beyond No-
Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra note 71, at
31. However, enhancement and diminishment in earning capacities should be
analyzed separately rather than in parallel. The method recommended in section
5.06 of the ALI Principles for compensating a spouse for a loss in earning capacity
requires the loss to be based on childcare. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, §
5.06, at 317. The compensation is based on the childcare period and the difference
in the spouses' incomes after dissolution rather than the actual reduction in that
spouse's earning capacity. See id.
16 See WEITZMAN, supra note 30, at 17.
"47 See Allen M. Parkman, The Economic Approach to Valuing a Sacrificed
Career in Divorce Proceedings, 2 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 45 (1986);
Allen M. Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in Divorce
Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439, 449-50 (1987). Other authors have argued that
an equally important process has been increased specialization among women. See
June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology,
Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REv. 953, 990 (1991).
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foregoing additional education or on-the-job training. 4 It is reasonable
during marriage for the spouses to alter their activities or increase their
specialization relative to what they would have done if they were not
married. Rather than pursue his or her best career opportunities, a spouse
may elect to make concessions that are in the best interest of the family,
while not being in his or her narrowly defined best interest. These
sacrifices are particularly obvious when a couple has children, but they can
occur in childless marriages. The arrival of children usually results in one
parent, usually the mother, decreasing work outside the home to the
detriment of that parent's career. The parents may be tempted to share the
responsibility for child rearing, but usually it is less costly to the couple for
just one parent to alter his or her employment than for both to alter their
employment. Higher paying jobs often require unexpected overtime and
travel. If both parents reject that type of employment to be available for
childcare responsibilities, they may be worse off than if only one parent
makes that choice. Lower average wages generally available to women
often make the mother the lower cost provider of child rearing.' 49 Because
that specialization may potentially reduce her earnings later,150 the mother
would rationally want a long-term agreement to protect herself from the
potential costs of that decision. These sacrifices can also occur among
childless couples when a spouse's job relocation benefits the couple, but
requires the other spouse to sacrifice his or her opportunities.
These arrangements can result in a debt that is very much like an
implied contract of indemnification from the couple to the person making
the sacrifice. If the wife's best employment opportunity at dissolution has
an annual salary of $25,000 and similarly qualified people who have
worked full-time throughout the same period are making $40,000, the wife
will take five years to catch up with that higher salary and will incur a loss
4I Because of a lack of understanding of what constitutes property, some
authors have argued that these sacrifices should be considered as part of alimony,
rather than as part of the property division. See Ellman, supra note 8, at 42.
"I The percentage of fathers who assume the primary childcare role should
increase as women's earnings rise. The ratio of female to male wages for median
year-round earnings remained in the range from .57 to .61 during the 1960s and
1970s, but this ratio has had a steady increase in the 1980s, rising to .66 in 1987.
See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP 60 (1990). That ratio
has continued to increase to .72 in 1993. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1995, supra
note 1, at 477.
"
5
' See Joni Hersh & Leslie S. Stratton, Housework, Fixed Effects, and Wages
orMarried Workers, 32 J. HUM. RESOURCES 285 (1997); Leslie Stratton, TheEffect
Interruptions in Work Experience Have on Wages, 61 S. ECON. J. 955 (1995).
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of $40,000 (if future losses are discounted to present value at ten percent).
Since it is a debt that should be shared by the couple, the husband should
pay the wife $20,000 either in a lump sum or periodic payments. This debt
normally should be shared by the spouses unless there was socially
unacceptable behavior. This type of behavior occurs when, for example, a
woman sacrificed an opportunity that is no longer available based on
assurances that the marriage was durable and yet the husband was having
an affair that ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the marriage. In that
case, the husband should be responsible for the entire debt.
The attraction of treating these sacrifices as debts is the reduction in
arbitrariness combined with the ex-spouses now having incentives to
pursue their best employment and remarriage opportunities. Concerns
about computational complexity are often overstated. 5 ' The courts could
take judicial notice oftabies of earnings by age group and educational level
for full-time employed men and women. 52 These could be compared to the
relevant spouse's current best alternative with the expectation that any
difference would be eliminated within a period equal to half the duration
of the absence from the workforce.1 3 As with the ALI Principles, spouses
who deviate substantially from the normal situations should be encouraged
to draft their own pre- or postmarital agreement. 54
The loss is due to this marriage, and therefore the loss should not be
terminated with remarriage nor should it be modified.'5 5 If the spouse's
'-' See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, § 506 cmt. e, at 326. The compensation
provided by the ALI Principles is based on the childcare duration and the
difference in the incomes of the spouses after dissolution. See id. § 506(4), at 318.
While having the attraction of simplicity, that scheme bears little relationship to the
actual sacrifices and would be highly arbitrary.
152 Tables with the mean earnings for year-round, full-time workers by sex, age,
and education are available using the Current Population Survey, which is a
monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census
for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See, e.g., MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS,
supra riote 131.
113 Part-time work could be treated as a half year's absence. Age-earnings
profiles initially tend to be steep, reflecting the importance of on-the-job training
that complements earlier formal education. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 67.
Therefore, there normally should be a fairly rapid convergence between an
individual's actual and potential incomes.
154 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, § 501 cmt. b, at 257.
155 In contrast, the ALI Principles limits compensation to caretakers of children
with an award normally terminating at remarriage. See id. § 5.06, at 317, § 5.08,
at 350.
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human capital is reduced by decisions made during a subsequent marriage,
then that reduction will have to be determined if that marriage is dissolved.
These personal sacrifices are an important source of the gains from the
family for its participants and therefore should be encouraged.'56
V. CONSISTENCY AFTER DIVORCE
Basing the financial obligations at dissolution on debts would also
increase consistency after divorce because support and property division
obligations are currently treated differently under the Bankruptcy Code. 57
This is especially important because property division obligations, which"
are less predictable under the Bankruptcy Code, have become the preferred
vehicle for dealing with the financial arrangements between ex-spouses. 5 1
Individuals can file for bankruptcy using three chapters of the Bankruptcy
Code: 59 Chapter 7 if they want to discharge their debts and liquidate their
nonexempt assets; 60 Chapter 11 if they want to reorganize their financial
affairs through a reorganization; 161 or Chapter 13 if they want to adjust their
debts and they have a regular income.'62 A limited number of people also
avail themselves of bankruptcy using Chapter 12, in which the debts of a
family farmer with regular income are adjusted.161 Of primary concern are
Chapter 7 and 13 filings. Under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, awards or
agreements in the nature of support between ex-spouses were
nondischargeable, while obligations arising from property divisions could
be discharged in the same manner as ordinary commercial debts.164 These
156 See Allen M. Parkman, The Deterioration in the Family: A Law and Eco-
nomics Perspective, in THE INDIVIDUAL, THE FAMILY AND SOCIAL GOOD:
PERSONAL FULFILLMENT IN TIMES OF CHANGE 21 (Gary Melton ed., 1995). It has
been shown that no-fault divorce has encouraged married women to work outside
the home, often to their and their family's detriment. See also Parkman, Married
Women, supra note 116.
's
7 See generally White, supra note 12, at 626; Parkman, Dischargeability,
supra note 12, at 496.
158 See CLARK, supra note 8, at 589.
'19 For a summary of the Bankruptcy Code, see MICHAEL J. HERBERT,
UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY (1995).
160 See 1I U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
'
6 1 See id. §§ 1101-1146.
162 See id. §§ 1301-1330.
'
63 See id. §§ 1201-1231.
'64 The Bankruptcy Code provided:
A discharge... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
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provisions caused substantial concern because they were viewed as
conferring substantial benefits on debtor ex-spouses, especially men.16 The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 ("Reform Act") addresses these concerns
by extending the restrictions on the dischargeability of support commit-
ments to most property division obligations in Chapter 7, 11, and 12
cases. 166 Still, obligations based on a property division can be discharged
in Chapter 13 cases and even in Chapter 7, 11, and 12 cases under certain
circumstances. 67 Under Chapters 7, 11, and 12, property division obliga-
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record,
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that-
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation
of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section
402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been
assigned to the Federal Government or to a State or any political
subdivision of such State); or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance,
or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support ....
Id. § 523(a)(5) (1994) (amended 1996).
161 See Suzanne E. Doherty, The Interplay Between Bankruptcy and Divorce:
Which Former Spouse Deserves the Fresh Start?, 99 COMM. L.J. 192, 228 (1994);
Sheryl L. Scheible, Bankruptcy and the Modification ofSupport: Fresh Start, Head
Start, or False Start?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 577, 598 (1991); Sheryl L. Scheible,
Defining "Support" Under Bankruptcy Law: Revitalization of the "Necessaries'"
Doctrine, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Obligations and
Bankruptcy Discharge: Rethinking the Support/Property Distinction, 30 HARV. J.
ON LEG. 43, 93-94 (1993); Ellen B. Vergos, Bankruptcy Issues Arising in Divorce
Practice, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 698-99 (1994).
166 For an analysis of the provisions of the Reform Act that affect divorce, see
White, supra note 12. For a review of recent cases under the provisions of the
Reform Act, see Richard H. Maloy, Using Bankruptcy Court to Modify Domestic
Relations Decrees: Problems Created by § 523(a)(15), 31 FAM. L.Q. 433,437-47
(1997).
167 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 304(e), 108
Stat. 4106, 4133 (codified as amended at 11 U.S;C. § 523 (1994)). Section
523(a)(15) provides:
(a) A discharge ... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(15) not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the
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tions can be discharged if the debtor does not have the "ability" to pay or
the benefit of discharging the debt to the debtor outweighs the detrimental
consequences to the creditor. 6 8 The result is that support obligations will
continue to be nondischargeable, while many property division obligations
will continue to be dischargeable. 169
debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record,
a determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit unless-
(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from
income or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be
expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor and, if the debtor is engaged in a business, for the
payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation,
and operation of such business or
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor than
outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse,
or child of the debtor ....
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (1994).
168 If the creditor ex-spouse does not file a timely complaint, the property
division debt will be discharged and the opportunity to object to its discharge is lost
forever. See Margaret Dee McGarity, When An Ex-spouse Goes Bankrupt, 81
A.B.A. J. 64, 65 (Nov. 1995).
169 On further reflection, the Reform Act's limits on the dischargeability of
debts other than support may not be as big an improvement as promised. See
Parkman, Dischargeability, supra note 12, at 509-10. The two conditions under
which a property settlement debt can be discharged under Chapters 7, 11, and 12
are when the debtor lacks the ability to pay and when the benefits of discharging
the debt to the debtor outweigh the detrimental consequences to the creditor. See
id. Both present problems for a creditor spouse.
First, if the debtor ex-spouse files for bankruptcy, his or her property division
obligations will automatically be discharged unless a determination of
nondischargeability is made by the bankruptcy court based on the timely filing of
an adversary proceeding. Since the assertion of the creditor spouse's rights is
potentially costly, the creditor spouse may not be willing to assert those rights. As
a result, these provisions create a strong incentive for debtor ex-spouses to file for
bankruptcy. See C. R. Bowles, Escaping the Bankruptcy Trap: The
Dischargeability ofMarital Obligations After the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
10 AM. J. FAM. LAW 171 (1996).
Second, the same income that was available before the divorce to support one
household is now supporting two households with the result that both households
are incurring financial difficulties. Since only the financial difficulties of debtors
are addressed and since their financial resources can be limited, one can only
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However, the distinction between support and property is based on the
law rather than the more appropriate financial analysis presented here.
From a financial perspective, both support and property are based on debts
incurred during marriage. In a business setting, these debts would generally
not have been incurred unless they were protected by a security interest,
with the result that the creditors' interests would be protected even in
bankruptcy. Consistency would be increased by recognizing that support
and property division obligations have equal standing as debts. Because it
is important that the sacrifices which are the basis of these debts be
encouraged during marriage, it is important that their repayment be
predictable, and therefore these debts should not be dischargeable in
bankruptcy.
speculate that often the limited ability of debtors to pay may be the basis for a
discharge. The test used in Chapter 13 filings has been adopted by most courts in
the context of filings under other chapters. Most courts are applying the test under
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) in the context of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A). See Bowles,
supra, at 177. Other courts have applied the student loan test to the new property
settlement exception. See White, supra note 12, at 636.
Last, ambiguity leads to additional litigation, and the weighing of the benefits
of discharging the debt to the debtor and the detrimental consequences to the
creditor is very ambiguous. When both parties to litigation have a reasonably clear
idea of the outcome of the litigation, they have incentives to settle to avoid the
costs of a trial. Alternatively, when outcomes are uncertain, both parties may
overestimate their chances of success with the result that they will continue to incur
the costs of litigation, increasing the probability of a trial. See RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 555 (4th ed. 1992). More litigation is detrimental to
all ex-spouses.
A continuing major concern, Chapter 13, which was not amended in 1994,
contains its own nondischargeable debt provisions that permit the discharge of
property division obligations. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1994). Nondischargeable
debts under § 1328(a) include long-term debts for which the final payment is due
after completion of the plan, support obligations, educational loans, and debts for
death or personal injury arising out of the debtor's use of a motor vehicle while
intoxicated. See id. The creditor ex-spouse who is holding a property settlement
obligation must raise good faith objections to the filing of Chapter 13, the plan
confirmation, or both in order to prevent discharge of a property division debt
under Chapter 13. See White, supra note 12, at 639. It would be naive not to
anticipate a substantial increase in Chapter 13 filings by ex-spouses to take
advantage of this obvious loophole.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The current financial arrangements at divorce lack a consistent
framework resulting in injustice and inefficiency. The primary causes of
these problems are the lack of logic behind alimony, the lack of a clear
understanding of what is property and how it should be allocated, and the
lack of protection for support and property division obligations after
dissolution. This situation could be improved by recognizing the debts
incurred during marriage and then using them as a basis for these financial
arrangements. Debts are created during marriage when spouses make
sacrifices for which future compensation is appropriate or when they
become parents, in which case society imposes on them an obligation to
support their children. To encourage these sacrifices when they benefit the
family, these debts should not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.

